博弈论 英文1.Consider the following game with perfect information.N=2 players,1and 2.They start the game with 1RMB each.Player 1 moves first.Each player has the option to stop(S) or continue(C).If a player chooses S,both players receive the amou

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博弈论 英文1.Consider the following game with perfect information.N=2 players,1and 2.They start the game with 1RMB each.Player 1 moves first.Each player has the option to stop(S) or continue(C).If a player chooses S,both players receive the amou
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博弈论 英文1.Consider the following game with perfect information.N=2 players,1and 2.They start the game with 1RMB each.Player 1 moves first.Each player has the option to stop(S) or continue(C).If a player chooses S,both players receive the amou
博弈论 英文
1.Consider the following game with perfect information.N=2 players,1and 2.They start the game with 1RMB each.Player 1 moves first.Each player has the option to stop(S) or continue(C).If a player chooses S,both players receive the amount they got so far; If a player chooses C,he loses 1RMB and 2RMB go to his rival.Alternatively,the game stops when both players got 4RMB.Find all subgame perfect equilibrium.
2.2 players game (G)
(Payoff)
2 A B C
1
A 5,5 0,11 0,0
B 11,0 4,4 0,0
C 0,0 0,0 0,0
Consider a game consisting of 3 prepetitions of G,with S=1.Is it possible to support (A,A) in some repetition of the game at equilibrium?If yes,show the strategies.
3.Consider the 2 players game.
(Payoff)
2 L R
1
U 1,0 1,1
C 1,1 0,0
D 0,1 2,0
Discuss the following statement:"The iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies doesn't eliminate all NE(Nash Equilibrium)" (In maximium 10 lines).

博弈论 英文1.Consider the following game with perfect information.N=2 players,1and 2.They start the game with 1RMB each.Player 1 moves first.Each player has the option to stop(S) or continue(C).If a player chooses S,both players receive the amou
随便写写啊,可能不对.
1,画出博弈树,然后采用倒推法,最终发现纳什均衡在（1,1）处
2,找出纳什均衡,（b,b）（c,c）,但是我没有学过走出囚徒困境,我认为无法做到（A,A）因为无论玩家一或二都A都是无用威胁.
3NEqm'是（c,l）但是c是若劣势（weakly domin）所以,若劣势策略有可能会把纳什均衡剔除,但是不一定的~
有些不懂,愿大神指点!

楼主我虽然没学过博弈，但我刚才花了点时间学了下....


按我的理解(对英语描述和博弈的理解）（英语较差...），我画了博弈树，发现应该只有三种可行：

P1=PLAER1 P2=PLAYER2 S=STOP C=CONTINUE   


  1. P1S  P2S ...

    全部展开

    楼主我虽然没学过博弈，但我刚才花了点时间学了下....


    按我的理解(对英语描述和博弈的理解）（英语较差...），我画了博弈树，发现应该只有三种可行：

    P1=PLAER1 P2=PLAYER2 S=STOP C=CONTINUE   


    1. P1S  P2S 

    2. P1C  P2C  P1S 

    3. P1C  P2C  P1C  P2C  P1C  P2C  


    剩下两题没精力了...看情况吧。

    收起

    第二题，加个suppose然后重复两次博弈吧

    一节课。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。