Game theorySuppose there are n firms in the Cournot oligopoly model.Let qi denote the quantity produce by firm i,and let Q = q1 +:::+qn denote the aggregate quantity on the market.Let P denote the market-clearing price and assume that the inverse dem

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Game theorySuppose there are n firms in the Cournot oligopoly model.Let qi denote the quantity produce by firm i,and let Q = q1 +:::+qn denote the aggregate quantity on the market.Let P denote the market-clearing price and assume that the inverse dem
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Game theorySuppose there are n firms in the Cournot oligopoly model.Let qi denote the quantity produce by firm i,and let Q = q1 +:::+qn denote the aggregate quantity on the market.Let P denote the market-clearing price and assume that the inverse dem
Game theory
Suppose there are n firms in the Cournot oligopoly model.Let qi denote the quantity produce by firm i,and let Q = q1 +:::+qn denote the aggregate quantity on the market.Let P denote the market-clearing price and assume that the inverse demand is given by P(Q)=a-Q (assuming Q < a,else P = 0).Assume that the total cost of firm i from producing quantity qi is Ci(qi) = c*qi.That is,there are no fixed costs and the marginal cost is constant at c,where we assume c < a.Following
Cournot,suppose that the firms choose their quantities simultaneously.What is the Nash equilibrium?What happens to the market-clearing price as n approaches infinity?

Game theorySuppose there are n firms in the Cournot oligopoly model.Let qi denote the quantity produce by firm i,and let Q = q1 +:::+qn denote the aggregate quantity on the market.Let P denote the market-clearing price and assume that the inverse dem
专业词汇太多,我虽然想帮你做但是很多词不认得,先放到英语系列找专业八级的帮你翻译再放到这边就成.看起来似乎不是很复杂的数学题.

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