英语翻译不要用在线翻译翻的,句子根本就不通,自己翻不来.新注册的号 Critics of these capital regulations have rightly pointed to these cap-ital requirements as having contributed to the subprime crisis by per-mitting banks t

英语翻译不要用在线翻译翻的,句子根本就不通,自己翻不来.新注册的号 Critics of these capital regulations have rightly pointed to these cap-ital requirements as having contributed to the subprime crisis by per-mitting banks t
英语翻译
不要用在线翻译翻的,句子根本就不通,自己翻不来.新注册的号
Critics of these capital regulations have rightly pointed to these cap-
ital requirements as having contributed to the subprime crisis by per-
mitting banks to maintain insufficient amounts of equity capital per
unit of risk undertaken in their subprime holdings.
Investment banks were also permitted by capital regulations that
were less strict than those applying to commercial banks to engage in
subprime-related risk with insufficient budgeting of equity capital.
Investment banks faced capital regulations under SEC guidelines
that were similar to the more permissive Basel II rules that apply to
commercial banks outside the United States.Because those capital
regulations were less strict than capital regulations imposed on U.S.
banks,investment banks were able to lever their positions more than
commercial banks.Investment banks’ use of overnight repurchase
agreements as their primary source of finance also permitted them
to “ride the yield curve” when using debt to fund their risky asset
positions; in that respect,collateralized repos appeared to offer a
substitute for low-interest commercial bank deposits.2 But as the col-
lateral standing behind those repos declined in value and became
risky,“haircuts” associated with repo collateral became less favorable,
and investment banks were unable to roll over their repos positions,
a liquidity risk that added to their vulnerability and made their equi-
ty capital positions even more insufficient as risk buffers.
There is no doubt that the financial innovations associated with
securitization and repo finance were at least in part motivated by reg-
ulatory arbitrage.Furthermore,there is no doubt that if on-balance-
sheet commercial bank capital regulations had determined the
amount of equity budgeted by all subprime mortgage originators,
then the leverage ratios of the banking system would not have been
as large,and the liquidity risk from repo funding would have been
substantially less,both of which would have contributed to reducing
the magnitude of the financial crisis.
And yet,I do not agree with those who argue that the subprime
crisis is mainly a story of government “errors of omission,” which
allowed banks to avoid regulatory discipline due to the insufficient
application of existing on-balance-sheet commercial bank capital
regulations to the risks undertaken by investment banks and off-balance-sheet conduits.The main story of the subprime crisis
instead is one of government “errors of commission,” which were far
more important in generating the huge risks and large losses that
brought down the U.S.financial system.

英语翻译不要用在线翻译翻的,句子根本就不通,自己翻不来.新注册的号 Critics of these capital regulations have rightly pointed to these cap-ital requirements as having contributed to the subprime crisis by per-mitting banks t
那么大一段,好心人帮不了你.可以给你估价下,这些字大致要人民币150.建议你分小段提问,说不定有人像我这样闲着无聊进来看看回答一下

这些资本规定的批评家们正确地指出，这些帽
每到次贷危机作出了贡献ITAL要求
mitting银行维持股本不足的金额，每
在他们的次级控股单位的风险进行。
投资银行也被允许资本规定
小于向商业银行申请从事的严格
次贷相关的风险与股本不足预算。
投资银行面临的资本规定，证券交易委员会的指引下
更宽松的巴塞尔II规则适用于类似

全部展开

这些资本规定的批评家们正确地指出，这些帽
每到次贷危机作出了贡献ITAL要求
mitting银行维持股本不足的金额，每
在他们的次级控股单位的风险进行。
投资银行也被允许资本规定
小于向商业银行申请从事的严格
次贷相关的风险与股本不足预算。
投资银行面临的资本规定，证券交易委员会的指引下
更宽松的巴塞尔II规则适用于类似
在美国以外的商业银行。由于这些资本
规定那么严格，比对美国施加的资本规定
银行，投资银行杠杆能够超过自己的立场
商业银行。投资银行的隔夜回购
作为其融资的主要来源的协议还允许他们
“骑”时使用债务融资的风险资产的收益曲线
职位;在这方面，抵押回购协议提供
低利率商业银行deposits.2但作为替代的COL-
侧向站立落后回购价值下降，并成为
风险，“理发”回购抵押品变得不太有利，
和投资银行无法翻身回购位置，
流动性风险，增加他们的脆弱性，并提出了自己的马巴贝西
TY资本头寸风险的缓冲区更加不足。
没有疑问，金融创新与
金融证券和回购至少部分是出于章
ulatory套利。此外，毫无疑问，如果平衡
表商业银行资本监管已确定
所有的次级抵押贷款发起人的股本金额预算，
然后不会有银行体系的杠杆比率
本来大，从回购资金的流动性风险
大幅度减少，这两者将有助于减少
金融危机的严重程度。
然而，我不同意那些认为次贷
危机主要是政府的故事“错误遗漏”
允许银行，以避免因不足的监管纪律
应用现有的资产负债表的商业银行资本
投资银行和资产负债表渠道承担的风险的规定。次贷危机的主要故事
取而代之的是政府的一个“错误的佣金，”远
在产生巨大的风险和大的损失，更重要的
击落美国的金融体系。

收起