英语翻译Bankruptcy laws and debt renegotiation AbstractThis paper analyzes the effect of the toughness of bankruptcy law on the number of liquidations in a simple model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information,where the creditor canno

英语翻译Bankruptcy laws and debt renegotiation AbstractThis paper analyzes the effect of the toughness of bankruptcy law on the number of liquidations in a simple model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information,where the creditor canno
英语翻译
Bankruptcy laws and debt renegotiation
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of the toughness of bankruptcy law on the number of liquidations in a simple model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information,where the creditor cannot credibly commit to liquidate the firm if the default occurs.In our setting we consider a bankruptcy law to be a one-dimensional variable that influences creditor's expectation value of collateral.We find that there is an interval of the bankruptcy law,where the number of liquidations decreases in the toughness of the bankruptcy law.We also find that if the liquidation costs are high,softer bankruptcy law is preferred.
Keywords:Bankruptcy law ; Debt renegotiation; Soft budget constraint
1.Introduction
Bankruptcy laws are recognized as fundamental institutions necessary for growth of credit markets and entrepreneurship.They define the rules and procedures under which a creditor can take possession of entrepreneur's assets and hence directly influence the creditor's incentives to liquidate an insolvent company.Ideally,a bankruptcy law should protect creditors,impose financial discipline on managers,induce restructuring,and free assets from inefficient use.However,there is no clear agreement on the optimal bankruptcy law design.Moreover,bankruptcy laws differ across countries substantially along many dimensions such as allocation of control rights,priority rules or the role of judges and courts.Not surprisingly,it is unlikely that a single design of these bankruptcy laws fits all possible situations1 and different bankruptcy law designs have different effects on the number of liquidations in the country.observe different effects of the bankruptcy law on the number of liquidations with respect to different quality of law enforcement.

英语翻译Bankruptcy laws and debt renegotiation AbstractThis paper analyzes the effect of the toughness of bankruptcy law on the number of liquidations in a simple model of borrowing and lending with asymmetric information,where the creditor canno
破产法及债务谈判
摘要
本文分析的影响,韧性破产法的人数清盘个案,在一个简单的模型的借贷服务与信息不对称,如果债权人不能令人信服地承担清算公司如果违约发生.在我们设定我们认为破产法是一个一维变量的影响,债权人的期望,抵押品的价值.我们发现有一个区间的破产法,凡有多少清盘的跌幅韧性的破产法.我们还发现,如果清算成本高,柔软的破产法是首选.
关键词：破产法;债务谈判;软预算约束
1 .导言
破产法是公认的基本机构,为有需要的增长,信贷市场和创业精神.他们确定的规则和程序下,债权人可以占有企业家的资产,从而直接影响到债权人的诱因,清算破产公司.理想的情况下,破产法应该保护债权人的,施加财经纪律,对管理人员,诱使转型,并免费资产使用效率低下.不过,目前并无明确的协议,关于最优的破产法设计.此外,破产法等国而异大幅沿线的许多层面,如分配的控制权,优先权规则或法官的作用和法院.毫不奇怪,它不可能成为一个单一的设计,这些破产法适用于所有可能situations1和不同的破产法的设计有不同的影响有多少清盘案在该国.观察不同的影响,破产法的人数清盘案与尊重不同的执法质量.